An access weakness occurs when software does not properly implement permissions that could have unintended consequences if exploited by malicious actors. An example of this weakness is when a default username and password are set by the developer but do not get changed by the system administrator.
If this call fails, the program could fail to drop heightened privileges.
mozc-2.17.2077.102/base/win_sandbox.cc
The highlighted line of code below is the trigger point of this particular Fedora 24 access weakness.
PROCESS_INFORMATION process_info = {};
// 3rd parameter of CreateProcessAsUser must be a writable buffer.
if (!::CreateProcessAsUser(primary_token.get(),
nullptr, // No application name.
command_line->get(), // must be writable.
security_attributes_ptr,
nullptr,
FALSE, // Do not inherit handles.
creation_flags,
nullptr, // Use the environment of the caller.
startup_directory,
&startup_info,
&process_info)) {
const DWORD last_error = ::GetLastError();
DLOG(ERROR) << "CreateProcessAsUser failed. Error: " << last_error;
return false;
}
if (security_attributes_ptr != nullptr) {
::LocalFree(security_attributes_ptr->lpSecurityDescriptor);
}
// Change the token of the main thread of the new process for the
// impersonation token with more rights.
if (!::SetThreadToken(&process_info.hThread, impersonation_token.get())) {
const DWORD last_error = ::GetLastError();
DLOG(ERROR) << "SetThreadToken failed. Error: " << last_error;
::TerminateProcess(process_info.hProcess, 0);
::CloseHandle(process_info.hProcess);
::CloseHandle(process_info.hThread);
return false;
}
if (thread_handle != nullptr) {
thread_handle->reset(process_info.hThread);
} else {
::CloseHandle(process_info.hThread);
}
if (process_handle != nullptr) {
process_handle->reset(process_info.hProcess);
} else {
::CloseHandle(process_info.hProcess);
}
if (pid != nullptr) {
*pid = process_info.dwProcessId;
}
return true;
}
bool SpawnSandboxedProcessImpl(unique_ptr<wchar_t[]> *command_line,