This weakness involves creating non-standard or non-tested algorithms, using weak algorithms or applying cryptographic algorithms incorrectly. Algorithms that were once considered safe are commonly later found to be unsafe, as the algorithms were broken.
The crypt functions use a poor one-way hashing algorithm; since they only accept passwords of 8 characters or fewer and only a two-byte salt, they are excessively vulnerable to dictionary attacks given today's faster computing equipment.
grive2-ae06eccb38b2fe250c9ddeac3e3973f80b8a0aa9/libgrive/src/base/Resource.cc
The highlighted line of code below is the trigger point of this particular Fedora 24 crypto weakness.
m_json = &state;
// root folder is always in sync
if ( !IsRoot() )
{
fs::path path = Path() ;
bool is_dir;
os::Stat( path, &m_ctime, NULL, &is_dir ) ;
m_name = path.filename().string() ;
m_kind = is_dir ? "folder" : "file";
bool is_changed;
if ( state.Has( "ctime" ) && (u64_t) m_ctime.Sec() <= state["ctime"].U64() &&
( is_dir || state.Has( "md5" ) ) )
{
if ( !is_dir )
m_md5 = state["md5"];
is_changed = false;
}
else
{
if ( !is_dir )
{
m_md5 = crypt::MD5::Get( path );
// File is changed locally. TODO: Detect conflicts
is_changed = !state.Has( "md5" ) || m_md5 != state["md5"].Str();
}
else
is_changed = true;
}
if ( state.Has( "srv_time" ) )
m_mtime.Assign( state[ "srv_time" ].U64(), 0 ) ;
// Upload file if it is changed and remove if not.
// State will be updated to sync/remote_changed in FromRemote()
m_state = is_changed ? local_new : remote_deleted;
if ( m_state == local_new )
{
// local_new means this file is changed in local.
// this means we can't delete any of its parents.
// make sure their state is also set to local_new.
Resource *p = m_parent;
while ( p && p->m_state == remote_deleted )
{
p->m_state = local_new;
p = p->m_parent;
}
}
}